Conclusions
As noted, the success factors in Ireland’s WGA are rooted in the nature, size and adaptability of its public administration, whose very light but well-focused institutional structure has been consistently engaged in peace-support and crisis management operations since the late 1950s. It admittedly does suffer from the absence of an overall policy concept and the lack of administrative resources and policy specialisation. Nevertheless, Irish policymakers are also eager for the European Union to develop a stronger WGA infrastructure and policy orientation to which they can contribute their added value. To that end, they have championed improved EU-UN-AU coordination on both the policy and operational levels in addition to enthusiastically promoting the Civilian CSDP Compact as a means by which a broader ‘security’ remit can be brought to bear to prevent, manage and resolve international security crises. Due to a comparatively benign national security threat assessment, Irish policymakers can also prioritise international security engagement without also having to triangulate between national security or defence interests. This allows for a WGA that is rooted in addressing the centrality of third-country security needs rather than only seeing such needs through the prism of national security priorities. Indeed, Ireland’s overall approach to WGAs may be of interest as an adaptable model for countries with similar geographic sizes and populations given its flexibility and ability to enable effective communication and problem-solving.