Conclusions
The success of a WGA in Spain is contingent upon several factors. The national strategic culture and the preference for multilateral frameworks of action in foreign and security policy have prevented the development of a national WGA instrument to deal with external crises and conflicts. The preference for playing a supporting role reduces the level of ambition for a Spanish WGA. The lack of explicit documents and doctrines on WGA reveals that a WGA is viewed as a best practice for management but mainly for EU affairs. Although Spain contributes by having Spanish actors who are familiar with WGA procedures participate in CFSP/CSDP projects, it is not able or willing to develop its own WGA system.
A growing familiarity with WGA procedures and the creation of the National Security System could change Spain’s level of ambition about adopting a WGA, but it will require political leadership. Indeed, strong political backing will be necessary for Spanish participation in CSDP missions and operations, especially if they go against the dominant strategic culture and could potentially impact political or social situations. Of course, the need for hard decisions on CSDP missions and operations is very limited at the moment, but it could change in the future if the EU increases its strategic autonomy and operational level of ambition.
A lack of national leadership is both the cause and effect of Spain’s lack of a crisis-management system for responding to external crises and conflicts at the level of the president of the government (as the prime minister is known). Granted, the basic elements – structures, procedures and regulations – of a WGA-like model of management already exist, but they are mainly geared towards internal crises or situations impacting national security. The jump to a genuine WGA at the presidential level could happen sooner than expected given the progressive acknowledgment within the National Security System that complex crises are better coordinated at the supra-agency level. However, it will be very difficult for the National Security System to displace ministries and agencies from the management of external crises and conflicts unless a person with strong leadership skills and a desire to alter this situation holds the presidency. Meanwhile, all other factors being equal, the de facto delegation of the national WGA system to the European one will continue to work reasonably well.
The rivalries among potential WGA actors in Spain are both the cause and effect of the lack of an inter-agency culture of coordination. As explained above, these actors do coordinate their contributions to CSDP missions and operations, but they do so without set procedures to facilitate the development of a WGA culture. However, their reluctance to cooperate could diminish if the government or the EU were to provide the proper funding to CSDP missions and operations instead of exhausting the agencies’ limited budgets. That said, if there is a feeling that the burden-sharing is unfair, it may increase their resistance to contribute to national commitments.
Material resources are not the only obstacles to developing a culture and practice of WGA in Spain. The administrative difficulties faced in recruiting civil servants or independent experts to participate in a WGA will also affect Spain’s contribution to CSDP efforts, such as the development of the EU’s ‘Civilian Compact’ to reinforce its capacity to deploy civilian expertise. For these and other reasons, the failure to establish a connection between national and EU WGA cultures – which has actually been a strategic goal of Spanish governments – puts the ‘effectiveness’ of the European multilateral framework at risk. In fact, the absence of an effective multilateral WGA management in the EU could reverse the trend towards the convergence of WGA cultures and practices towards having national and ad hoc ones. Without such convergence, the Spanish push for an EU-versus-national WGA model of coordination may fail, and Spain would find itself without any national or collective procedure to manage international crises and conflicts.
Transparency and accountability also matter for WGA systems. The evaluation of the CSDP missions and operations must include the WGA procedures, as well, in order to gauge their contribution to final outcomes. Given the current lack of oversight and transparency, this best practice would permit Spanish lawmakers and members of its academic community to monitor the management of external crises and conflicts by both national and European WGA practitioners.