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Spain Report

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1 | Introduction

Until the 1980s or 1990s, Spain did not participate in crisis-management operations either alone or with third parties. This limited record of international engagement helps to explain the lack of national whole-of-government approach (WGA) instruments. Spain's first involvement with the WGA concept came during the Multinational Experiments series organised by NATO member states in the first decade of the new century to improve crisis-management procedures. Within that framework, Spain put together an interdisciplinary team comprised of diplomats, military officials and thinktank members to explore the potential of using an integrated approach to crisis management. Then, in June 2018, Spain's national delegation presented a first-ever assessment of Spain's WGA during the Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Prevention and Management Seminar (CAS) held in Helsinki (Rintakoski and Autti 2008: 168–172).

Later, when NATO and the EU developed their own WGA concepts, Spanish diplomats and military officials involved in the crisis-management systems of both organisations were familiarised with a WGA. Spain's Ministry of Defence and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the European Union and Cooperation (MAUC) soon imported this practice into their vocabulary and, since then, the number of mentions of a WGA ('enfoque integral' in Spanish) have proliferated in official documents. The first reference to a WGA appeared in the Spanish Security Strategy of 2011. The team tasked with elaborating this strategy was led by Javier Solana, who had become familiar with the WGA concept as the EU's high representative for common policy and security policy from 1999 to 2009. Believing that the WGA model offers

advantages in terms of managing national security, the team incorporated it into the document. In fact, they even called for the creation of an External and Integrated Response Unit (Unidad de Respuesta Integrada Exterior, URIE), although subsequent governments have not acted upon this explicit recommendation.

Unfortunately, subsequent administrations and governments have not thought (or perhaps cared) about strengthening inter-agency coordination. The national administration continues to be divided into watertight departments that very zealously guard their competences and display little openness to the idea of inter-agency cooperation. The president of the government (as the prime minister is known) could theoretically call for the National Security System to be re-designed to deal with international crises in a WGA mode by reinforcing its resources and competences. However, the management of external crises remains without presidential leadership and without any single authority able to impose a WGA upon all actors involved. For this reason, there are no binding guidelines to develop WGA or WGA-like concepts in Spain.

The MAUC's Strategy for External Action of 2015 acknowledges this shortcoming and highlights the "need to improve the integral approach in the management of crises, combining civil and military mechanisms more effectively", but it does so without identifying the proper measures to bring such an improvement about (MAUC 2015: 64). Indeed, the lack of WGA implementation reveals a gap between the high degree of importance that Spain assigns to the WGA concept and its limited real-world impact on governmental structures and procedures. Paradoxically, the theoretical success of the concept has created the virtual perception that national structures and procedures have been adapted for its implementation. For instance, the National Security Council (DSN) recommended in 2017 that the WGA model of crises management be imported into the sphere of national security, writing (DSN 2017: 82): "It is, therefore, a priority to further develop and adapt the comprehensive crisis management model within the framework of the National Security System in order to provide effective and timely responses to today's threats and challenges."

2 | What policies have been developed to further policy coherence?

Official documents acknowledge Spain's commitment to managing international crises and conflicts. Among others, the strategies for national security and external action include references to the WGA concept as the preferred way to accomplish the country's goals when it comes responding to multidimensional crises. Nevertheless, Spain's contribution to WGA commitments is heavily influenced by the country's strategic culture and its preference for working within multilateral frameworks.

First, Spain's strategic culture determines the level of ambition it has about using force in international commitments because decision-makers and the public tend to disapprove of the use of military power for historical and political reasons (cf. Arteaga 2013). This, in turn, makes it difficult for Spanish governments to carry out tasks within the more demanding part of the military spectrum of WGA operations. For the same reason, regardless of its actual relevance, they tend to overemphasise the humanitarian dimension of international commitments in order to prevent potential social or political opposition to Spanish military interventions.

Indeed, legitimisation matters because Spanish governments must acquire the authorisation of the Congress of Deputies before deploying troops abroad. Securing legitimisation is easier when the specific WGA operations fall under a wider European umbrella, as this allows governments to emphasise the EU's role as a global actor and the need for Spain to do its fair share to help Europe live up to its supposed responsibility to provide security worldwide, even in military terms. In this regard, unlike other international constellations that have carried out international crisis-management operations without obtaining legal authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, the EU is perceived as a reliable legitimiser.

That said, Spain's strategic culture will continue to influence its military commitments. For instance, Spanish governments are reluctant to transfer their authority over Spanish military contingents to foreign commanders without caveats (whether to avoid combat operations or so-called 'mission creep'). This bias will also impact Spain's contribution of troops to EU military initiatives even though it would be easier under a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework than under any other multinational framework.

Returning to the second major influence on Spain's contribution to WGA efforts, one can say that Spain generally prefers to contribute to international crisis management within the framework of international organisations, such as the EU, NATO or the UN. This preference for multilateral frameworks results from two factors: the aforementioned need to legitimise the military operations and the lack of national capabilities to conduct unilateral crisis-management operations. Indeed, acting within a multinational group helps Spanish governments to legitimise their military and civilian commitments because it is easier to justify them in terms of 'international responsibility' than of 'national interest'.

Furthermore, Spain understands that national contributions are needed to achieve 'effective' multilateralism, such as the one called for in the European Security Strategy of 2003. For this reason, Spain has accompanied the development of the European WGA concept and supported the elaboration of the European Security and Foreign Policy strategies, the development of external security instruments for the CSDP, and the effort towards EU strategic autonomy to act with others partners whenever possible or alone if necessary. Spain has also supported every initiative to develop the EU's crisis-management structures, including an operational headquarters (currently the Military Planning and Conduct Capability for non-executive missions), and its commitment has been more visible in the core of the development of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), together with France, Germany and Italy.

In terms of contributions of manpower, Spain is the top-ranking contributor to CSDP operations and missions. In fact, over the last decade, it has provided roughly 30 percent of all the men and women in uniform serving in EU-flagged operations and assumed a dozen mission commands, and Spain is the only country to have supplied troops to all EU military missions and operations since 2003 (Gómez Castro 2018: 33). Spain also takes part in the rotations of the EU battlegroups, assumes the command of naval operations (Atalanta at this moment), and contributes to the paramilitary forces of the Euro Gendarmerie Force by providing members of the Guardia Civil for CSDP missions and operations. Finally, Spain is contributing to the CSDP missions and operations in Africa, where the WGA is being implemented.

Regarding humanitarian and development aid, Spain is the fifth- largest contributor to the European development-cooperation funds. In the 2013–2017 period, it provided USD 5.273

billion, or 43 percent of the total funds (USD 12.405 billion). After being accredited in July 2011 as an executive agency of the European Commission, Spain's Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) has been managing EU funds associated with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (delegated cooperation). Spain allocates 30 percent of these funds to Africa, 23 percent to the Americas, 15 percent to Eastern Europe, and 14 percent to Asia under EU programmes (Olivie and Perez 2019: 2–5).

Africa is Spain's preferred setting for applying a WGA to prevent and manage international crises and conflicts. Its national security strategies have identified North Africa and the Sahel as the areas posing the greatest risk to its national security, and the MAUC's 2019 plan for Africa (MUAC 2019b) highlights the need to address the migration and security challenges in sub-Saharan Africa. Since Spain does not have the capacity to develop a unilateral WGA in these regions, it must contribute to the CSDP missions and operations in those areas and, as noted above, even boxes above its weight in these efforts. Outside these areas, Spain only carries out bilateral military, humanitarian or development-aid projects, devoting the greatest individual effort to Latin America (37%) and Africa (20%), roughly reversing the order of its contributions to EU-funded projects: 30 percent in Africa and 23 percent in Latin America.

Despite its support for and contributions to the European WGA, Spain faces serious obstacles to developing a national WGA. Without a centralised crisis-management system under the presidency of the government, ministries and agencies must use their own means to fulfil international commitments, and they do not receive any common funding or additional resources for WGA from the government. Limited resources, in turn, make ministries and agencies reluctant to take part in WGA missions and operations. What's more, in addition to financial resources, they also encounter difficulties finding human resources for such efforts. In the military sphere, the problem has to do with the increasing cost of maintenance and operations (around 20% of defence expenditures). In the civilian sphere, the government can neither force officials to participate in WGA missions nor does it have the necessary funds to recruit external experts. Given these circumstances, it is easier for Spain to contribute to the European model of WGA management than to develop its own model, as other European powers (e.g. France and the UK) have done.

3 | Who are the main actors involved in cooperating in a WGA?

In Spain, management of external crises has traditionally been a competence of the executive branch. The legislative branch only became involved in the decision-making process after Spain's controversial participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Two years later, the National Defence Act introduced the requirement that the Congress of Deputies provide its authorisation before Spanish troops are deployed abroad. At present, lawmakers are more active in terms of launching CSDP missions than in monitoring or evaluating them. Their contribution is limited to periodically receiving information from the ministers of defence and foreign affairs, and they play no active role in the crisis-management system.

The daily management of external conflicts and crises is mainly handled by the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. There are not any formalised coordination structures or procedures with other ministries or agencies, although the presidency of the government may have a hand in management efforts. When the National Security System was created in 2013,

the Council of National Security (DSN) was formed to be a new stakeholder with the appropriate WGA design to conduct crisis management. However, the DSN has focused its priorities to date on managing domestic crises rather than on external crises and conflicts, which has put any strategic management for CSDP missions into a kind of political-administrative limbo. As a result, responsibility for WGA coordination at the strategic level remains with Brussels-based governmental representatives of the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior who are involved in crisis management.

The president of the government delegates the management of external crises to the defence and foreign ministers without any structured or binding system of coordination. Thus, the model of WGA- like coordination for crises is the same as for the rest of the bilateral affairs between both ministries, and there is no specific bilateral mechanism other than the quarterly meetings with or without representatives of the presidency. Within the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, the Guardia Civil and the National Intelligence Center may contribute to a WGA effort. Their members have experience with EU missions and operations, and they receive training to become familiar with implementing the WGA concept. Their potential contribution to national WGA management became clear in the Canary Islands in 2006, when the Ministry of Interior led the multidimensional response of the Armed Forces, Frontex, the search and rescue agencies, local authorities and NGOs to a migration crisis.

The Armed Forces and the Guardia Civil, in particular, have expanded their basic responsibilities (i.e. defence and security, respectively) to include new dimensions related to the WGA. These include, among others, maritime security, border control, search and rescue, surveillance and technical assistance. Both forces also contribute to the ministerial programmes for international cooperation, which enhances their expertise for WGA contributions. For example, the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs jointly organise a 'defence diplomacy' programme.

For its part, the MAUC also contributes to developing the WGA concept. The diplomats and officials of the Foreign Service contribute to EU crisis management from national or common positions, while the MAUC's secretary of state for the European Union works as the point of contact between national and EU affairs. They contribute with traditional diplomatic instruments, except in the case of humanitarian and development aid, which is handled by Spain's Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID). Although the AECID has ties to the MAUC, the fact that it enjoys full autonomy makes it very difficult to incorporate these dimensions into the national WGA. The organisation's autonomy can be attributed to humanitarian agents' traditional suspicion that the government will try to use development aid as a leveraging tool in their foreign policies, or that humanitarian aid will potentially be politicised if it overlaps with other development, peace and security agendas (MAUC 2019a: 16).

However, this distrust might be diminishing as a result of two factors: first, the AECID's participation in programmes to reform the EU security sector; and, second, Spain's contribution to the financing of the EU's African Peace Facility via the European Development Fund (EDF), which supports peace operations led by African partners themselves (MAUC 2019b: 34). This change of mind is also due to the prominence that security is given as a goal in the UN's 2030 Agenda for sustainable development as well as to the linking of development and security in the EU's Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, as Spain's most recent

master plan for cooperation acknowledges (AECID 2018: 10). In both the MAUC's plan for Africa and the AECID's master plan for cooperation (the two documents cited above), Spain acknowledges the need to support the so-called 'security-development nexus' in order to improve the security of people and to reinforce the resilience of countries.

The ministries of Interior and Justice also support the development of the WGA in the EU, especially when it comes to the police, justice and penitentiary components of the CSDP's civilian missions. They contribute by providing experts from the National Police Corps, the Guardia Civil, or the justice and penitentiary institutions to carry out tasks related to security-sector reform, crime prevention and training local security forces, judges, prosecutors and the like. Their individual contributions are limited by the difficulties they face in recruiting civil servants to participate in such efforts for the reasons mentioned above. To help mitigate these limitations, civil servants have developed their own International and Ibero-American Foundation for Administration and Public Policies (FIIAPP), which has full autonomy to decide where, how and when to collaborate in the fields of development and governance. The FIIAPP acts as mediator between EU-funded programmes and the leading organisations, primarily as an agency for recruiting national experts. As an authorised executive agency of the European Commission since 2011, the FIIAPP manages community funds (delegated cooperation) to finance one third of its projects, and it is a key player in EU projects related to technical cooperation both within Europe and between the EU and Latin America (FIIAPP 2017: 1).

Since the role of the ministries of Interior and Justice is limited to authorising the mediation of the FIIAPP, they cannot take advantage of individual contributions to develop their own WGA experiences, structures and doctrines. Their limitation is higher in the field of external security because the contribution is limited to members of the Guardia Civil, who are the only individuals with the military education and authorisation to take part in gendarmerie-type missions within the CSDP. This handicap prevents many agencies from taking part in wider WGA actions despite their potential to add value. Another difficulty comes from the lack of funding to externalise the recruitment of national experts. Individual citizens are not eligible for CSDP missions because they cannot be contracted either as international seconded members for the EU or as 'freelancers' for the Spanish government. For these reasons, there are neither clusters of experts nor civil servants available for manning CSDP missions, which in turn affects Spain's contribution to WGA efforts.

4 | How does your country operationalise a WGA?

All in all, and despite the above-mentioned obstacles, Spanish actors have improved the operationalisation of their WGA capability within the EU framework. Having representatives from the various ministries in Spain's permanent mission to the EU in Brussels (REPER) facilitates strategic coordination in a WGA-like mode. Their colleagues back in Madrid, on the other hand, do not have daily contact with the WGA management. The operational and tactical levels of coordination remain within the intra-ministerial chains of command, both in the capital and on the ground. Their interaction remains limited by the low number of genuine WGA missions and operations at the EU level involving multiple dimensions as well as by the lack of nationalised ones.

Spain contributes to the EEAS crisis system mechanism in several phases on a timeline ranging from early warning to response. It provides the available national information to the EEAS's secretary general or to its deputy secretary general for CSDP and crisis response (DSG-CSDP) regarding the identification and assessment of a crisis or the related collection of data. It may also request that the DSG-CSDP pay attention to a potential crisis. The monitoring of the crisis is conducted at the national level in Madrid in close contact with the REPER in Brussels in order to foresee possible immediate actions. This process provides early warning and situational awareness, and it also facilitates any adjustments to advance and contingency planning on the strategic and operational levels.

Once a crisis-management concept has been approved in Brussels, Spanish military, diplomatic and civilian representatives assess the impact of strategic options for military and civilian actors. This assessment regarding a Spanish contribution is very close to the desired WGA way of management, and it goes from the national representatives in Brussels to their ministerial departments in the capital in order to nurture feedback within Brussels.

The presidency is informed about the situation, and any final decisions on CSDP missions are adopted by the government within the Council of Ministers. A contingency fund in the national budget provides funds for the deployment of troops under CSDP missions. The use of this extraordinary source of funding has been criticised for political and budgetary reasons, and the Armed Forces are facing further financial obstacles to participating in future CSDP missions and operations. Given these circumstances, it would be desirable for the EU's WGA to increase the amount of common funds available for military operations (via the so-called 'Athena' mechanism) in order to keep the contribution of Spanish troops at its current level.

The civilian costs are covered better via various EU mechanisms, and their amount is too small to cause financial troubles for the Spanish agencies. Common funding ensures that Spain will continue providing humanitarian and development aid as part of EU-led projects. However, one should always keep in mind the reluctance of humanitarian actors to see security and development efforts mixed. In fact, in response to this resistance, the Spanish government has a state-owned construction company (TRAGSA) to participate in reconstruction tasks, which is another national asset for WGA actions.

The WGA model is being exported to fields other than that of external crisis management. After the creation of the European Defence Fund and the European Defence Action Plan, public and private stakeholders in Spain agreed that there is a need to come up with new institutional arrangements for cooperating with EU institutions and action plans. For example, there has been the establishment of an inter-agency working group including representatives of the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Industry and Finance, of the key industrial associations, and of other organisations.

The outcome of this WGA coordination has been very relevant so far. It has allowed various stakeholders – including those in the defence sector – to see the opportunities and risks involved in EU initiatives, and it has contributed to raising public awareness about the need for a European Industrial and Technological Base (EDITB). Another example is the creation of a WGA model for preventing disinformation during electoral periods. Spain had already joined the Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, and it created a model based on the division of labour among the National Intelligence Centre

(Ministry of Defence), the Centre for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures (Ministry of Interior), and the Cyber Defence Command (Ministry of Defence) under the leadership of the secretary for communications of the presidency of the government. Although it is too early to access the effectiveness of this new WGA-like arrangement, the relevant issue is that the presidency has realised the need to manage complex crises using a WGA model. Given this acknowledgement, it is possible that a WGA could be applied to Spanish responses to external crises in the future.

5 | Conclusions

The success of a WGA in Spain is contingent upon several factors. The national strategic culture and the preference for multilateral frameworks of action in foreign and security policy have prevented the development of a national WGA instrument to deal with external crises and conflicts. The preference for playing a supporting role reduces the level of ambition for a Spanish WGA. The lack of explicit documents and doctrines on WGA reveals that a WGA is viewed as a best practice for management but mainly for EU affairs. Although Spain contributes by having Spanish actors who are familiar with WGA procedures participate in CFSP/CSDP projects, it is not able or willing to develop its own WGA system.

A growing familiarity with WGA procedures and the creation of the National Security System could change Spain's level of ambition about adopting a WGA, but it will require political leadership. Indeed, strong political backing will be necessary for Spanish participation in CSDP missions and operations, especially if they go against the dominant strategic culture and could potentially impact political or social situations. Of course, the need for hard decisions on CSDP missions and operations is very limited at the moment, but it could change in the future if the EU increases its strategic autonomy and operational level of ambition.

A lack of national leadership is both the cause and effect of Spain's lack of a crisis-management system for responding to external crises and conflicts at the level of the president of the government (as the prime minister is known). Granted, the basic elements – structures, procedures and regulations – of a WGA-like model of management already exist, but they are mainly geared towards internal crises or situations impacting national security. The jump to a genuine WGA at the presidential level could happen sooner than expected given the progressive acknowledgment within the National Security System that complex crises are better coordinated at the supra-agency level. However, it will be very difficult for the National Security System to displace ministries and agencies from the management of external crises and conflicts unless a person with strong leadership skills and a desire to alter this situation holds the presidency. Meanwhile, all other factors being equal, the de facto delegation of the national WGA system to the European one will continue to work reasonably well.

The rivalries among potential WGA actors in Spain are both the cause and effect of the lack of an inter-agency culture of coordination. As explained above, these actors do coordinate their contributions to CSDP missions and operations, but they do so without set procedures to facilitate the development of a WGA culture. However, their reluctance to cooperate could diminish if the government or the EU were to provide the proper funding to CSDP missions and operations instead of exhausting the agencies' limited budgets. That said, if there is a feeling

that the burden-sharing is unfair, it may increase their resistance to contribute to national commitments.

Material resources are not the only obstacles to developing a culture and practice of WGA in Spain. The administrative difficulties faced in recruiting civil servants or independent experts to participate in a WGA will also affect Spain's contribution to CSDP efforts, such as the development of the EU's 'Civilian Compact' to reinforce its capacity to deploy civilian expertise. For these and other reasons, the failure to establish a connection between national and EU WGA cultures – which has actually been a strategic goal of Spanish governments – puts the 'effectiveness' of the European multilateral framework at risk. In fact, the absence of an effective multilateral WGA management in the EU could reverse the trend towards the convergence of WGA cultures and practices towards having national and ad hoc ones. Without such convergence, the Spanish push for an EU-versus-national WGA model of coordination may fail, and Spain would find itself without any national or collective procedure to manage international crises and conflicts.

Transparency and accountability also matter for WGA systems. The evaluation of the CSDP missions and operations must include the WGA procedures, as well, in order to gauge their contribution to final outcomes. Given the current lack of oversight and transparency, this best practice would permit Spanish lawmakers and members of its academic community to monitor the management of external crises and conflicts by both national and European WGA practitioners.

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