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Germany Report

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1 | Introduction

Germany did not begin addressing the issue of policy coherence in its responses to external crises and conflict management until the late 1990s. Thus, the government was rather late to jump on a train that had already started a long journey within the UN, EU or OECD-DAC frameworks and that had resulted in advanced concepts in the UK and the Netherlands (Weiss, Spanger and van Meurs 2010). Thereafter, Germany's 'networked approach', as it is now called, evolved in two phases, each reacting to profound changes in the security environment. In the beginning, the agenda was driven by the many secessionist and civil wars that followed after the end of the Cold War and, in particular, the threat of international terrorism so vividly embodied by 9/11. Then, in the mid-2010s, the rise of the Islamic State and the wars in Syria and Iraq, in particular, drew fresh attention to this issue. The ensuing so-called migration crisis, which prompted Germany to take in roughly 1 million refugees in 2015, made conditions in Africa the focus of political and public attention in addition to putting the government under massive pressure to limit the flow of refugees and migrants.

Germany's almost unconditional supra- and multilateral orientation has also had a strong influence on the country's coherence agenda and its priorities. For the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), the strategy developments within NATO – which adopted its own 'Comprehensive Approach' in 1999 to justify out-of-area operations to manage crises and conflicts – were essential. For its part, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) closely followed the related discussions within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the OECD's Development Co-operation Directorate

(OECD-DAC). The latter's work on fragile states and its recommendations on the 'humanitarian-development-peace nexus', to which Germany contributed, were of particular importance. On the other hand, the conceptual thinking of Germany's Federal Foreign Office (AA) was guided by the security and peace strategies adopted in the EU, OSCE and UN, which Germany, as a member of these organisations, has undertaken to implement.

Germany has adopted a rather instrumentalist approach to joining multilateral efforts to respond to conflicts and crises. The reasons for this can be found in two casually related factors: a mindset forged by historical events and concrete constitutional limitations that this mindset gave rise to in the immediate postwar years.

Regarding the first factor, Germany has been described as a "post-heroic society" that rejects military values and, ultimately, heroism (Muenkler 2015). Indeed, the pledge 'Never again war, never again Auschwitz' is deeply engrained in the collective consciousness and severely limits the use of force other than in territorial self-defence (Weiss 2016). Such sentiments have made Germany's federal government feel obliged to comply with the 'do no harm' principle. The first fundamental policy shift (or watershed moment) in the German postwar doctrine only came about with the first deployment of German troops outside of NATO, during the Kosovo War in the late 1990s. Externally, embracing a strategy of policy coherence was viewed as useful for showing Germany's international partners that it was willing to take on more responsibilities. And, domestically, the strong emphasis that this approach laid on peacebuilding and the civilian side of conflict management made it easier to frame to a public reluctant to see its soldiers back in action abroad.

Turning to the second factor, one can say that the shadow of history does not only manifests itself in German society's widespread rejection of everything military. At the instigation of the Allied occupying powers, the German constitution (or Basic Law) contains a multitude of checks and balances whose impact reaches all the way to embrace attempts to pursue a networked approach. In order to prevent any renewed concentration of power – and, thus, the possibility of its abuse – the departmental principle (Ressortprinzip) gives federal ministers a very large degree of autonomy. No chancellor can command his or her ministers to do anything, and the chancellor's authority to issue directives does not change this fundamentally.

What's more, Germany's system of proportional representation legally reinforces this legislative effort to prevent any concentration of power by making it practically impossible to gain an absolute majority while at the same time granting small and medium-sized parties a right to participate in politics (provided they surpass a relatively low hurdle). As a result, postwar Germany has always been governed by coalitions of parties rather than any single party. However, as another result, the ministries of foreign affairs (AA), development (BMZ) and defence (BMVg), which are the most important bodies for a networked approach, have never been in the hands of a single party, which in turn creates a political environment that effectively promotes rivalry rather than cooperation. Furthermore, the distribution of ministries along party lines during coalition-forming negotiations is also the reason why the chancellor's authority to issue directives is a blunt sword. In fact, once drawn, the result is almost inevitably the collapse of the governing coalition.

2 | What policies have been developed to further policy coherence?

Strictly speaking, Germany's coherence agenda and its government's efforts to maintain and improve its capacities to respond to external crises and conflicts has developed as an elaborate method rather than a distinct policy or group of policies. Before diving into the documents that explicitly formulate this method, one should note that Germany's overall approach is based on the supposition that the country will only keep pace with the increasingly complex and multidimensional security challenges and threats if two prerequisites are met: First, supra- and multinational cooperation must be intensified. And, second, a security policy structure must be developed at the national level that goes beyond the traditional (and traditionally separate) foreign, development and defence policy portfolios by integrating all the relevant policies.

In specific terms, the history of Germany's networked approach begins with a one-pager in 2000. In that year, the governing coalition formed by the Social Democrats and the Green Party, which had taken on (federal) government responsibility for the first time, adopted the Comprehensive Concept of the Federal Government on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (Federal Government of Germany 2000), which laid foundations for Germany's approach that are still valid today. Based on a broad understanding of security that encompassed political, economic, ecological and social aspects, it committed Germany to the concept of "human security" (ibid.: 84).

It then took another four years before this approach was fleshed out even more with the Action Plan: Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building (Federal Government of Germany 2004). The political goal of this plan was to strengthen the preventive orientation of Germany's contributions to peace, security and development with a view to reducing the risks of crisis-prone developments and to thereby minimising the need to engage in military interventions – which was of paramount importance to Germany for the reasons discussed above. This was to be achieved in two ways: by establishing cross-departmental structures involving all ministries and by using their respective tools in a more harmonised way. The resulting policy approach encompasses conflict management before the outbreak of violence, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation (i.e. state-building). Notably, peace enforcement was not dealt with explicitly. Furthermore, the action plan calls also calls for improving strategies, structures and capabilities, particularly in response to interstate conflicts, state disintegration and fragility, asymmetric wars with non-state actors, and terrorism. With a typically German kind of thoroughness, the paper formulated 163 different actions to develop the approach.

The subsequent development of Germany's approach is consistently marked by a grappling with the question of how the country can reconcile its values-based peace orientation with the security policy requirements that have come to the fore. In the years that followed the 2004 action plan, the BMZ issued a series of strategy papers that elaborated on the nexus between peace, development and security in addition to highlighting the need to address the structural causes of conflict in the broadest sense. What's more, guidelines and methods for conflict-sensitive development cooperation geared to local social, societal and economic conditions were adopted. The preliminary conclusion of this first phase was reached with the publication of the White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (BMVg 2006), which should not be confused with a national security strategy. Section 1.4 of the paper,

titled 'Networked Security', essentially repeats the points of the 2004 action plan, thereby underlining its importance for guiding Germany's coherence policy.

The second phase of establishing the political and administrative framework for Germany's policy-coherence ambitions starts in 2016 with the publication of the White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Federal Government of Germany 2016). The following year saw the publication of the German government's 15th development policy report (BMZ 2017) and, more importantly, the Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace (Federal Government of Germany 2017), which replaced the action plan from 2004.

The new white paper (Federal Government of Germany 2016) includes a careful analysis of the security environment and identifies a broad spectrum of challenges and risks. The fact that most of them are non-military in nature and cannot be dealt with by force underlined the need to implement a coherence agenda, and the government renewed its pledge to further develop networked action and to optimise its implementation. To do so, the paper highlights four fields of action: strengthening the political working and decision-making structures of the federal government on the central issues of German foreign and security policy; expanding the government's abilities to analyse and evaluate by networking situation centres; intensifying the exchange of personnel among ministries; and promoting the joint training of governmental and non-governmental actors for action in the entire crisis cycle.

The guidelines (Federal Government of Germany 2017) flesh out the areas of action identified in the 2016 white paper, particularly regarding the issues of joint analysis as well as strategic and operative planning. They are meant to provide additional guidance to the government in its efforts to promote peace while focusing on how best to implement the concrete policy objectives set out in the UN's Agenda 2030. In particular, the guidelines spell out specific measures to promote economic development, employment and social security in Africa as well as in the host countries of refugees. In addition, the German government pledges to provide NATO and EU missions with capabilities across the entire spectrum – a commitment that the BMVg was presumably allowed to insert into the text – and to support the further development of the CSDP.

Like its predecessor, the 2004 action plan, the 2017 guidelines primarily focus on civilian fields of action and instruments for conflict prevention and post-conflict management, such as peace mediation, security-sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, and support for reconciliation. To this end, three interministerial working groups were established to draft sectoral strategies and to lay the conceptual foundations to be shared by all ministries. After completing their tasks, these three working groups published three strategy papers in autumn 2019 titled Interministerial Strategy to Support Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Context of Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding (Federal Government of Germany 2019a), Strategy of the Federal Government for promoting the rule of law in the fields of crisis prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Federal Government of Germany 2019b), and Interministerial Strategy to Support 'Dealing with the Past and Reconciliation (Transitional Justice)' in the Context of Preventing Crisis, Resolving Conflicts and Building Peace (Federal Government of Germany 2019c).

The guidelines also aimed to more closely dovetail instruments for early warning, to improve knowledge management (particularly in the field of fragile statehood), and to introduce systematic monitoring and evaluation processes. Furthermore, it undertook to draw up practical guidelines for principles of action (e.g. the 'do no harm' principle) to ensure that international quality standards are applied in all ministries. Work on the practical guidelines was also completed in summer 2019, and was published in the autumn as Operations Manual: Interministerial Approach to Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts and Building Peace (Federal Government of Germany 2019d).

With the 2017 guidelines, the government once again set out a large number (60) of specific and far-reaching commitments. This is admittedly fewer than the 163 commitments in the 2004 action plan. However, it is now easier to verify whether the government is complying with its obligations, as the commitments are separately listed in a special annex rather than being scattered throughout the document. Given that the guidelines are fairly new, their testing still lies ahead. The first implementation review is expected after four years and should be presented by the government in 2021.

3 | Who are the main actors involved in cooperating in a WGA?

In the many documents that have underpinned Germany's approach and have helped to continue developing it, there is not a single, standardised nomenclature regarding the unified approach under discussion. Instead, and even though all of them officially come from a single source (i.e. the federal government), the documents bear the signature of the specific ministry (or sometimes ministries) they originated in. The range of terms used have included, among others, the modifiers "cross-departmental" and "networked" and the noun "whole-of-government approach" (WGA). For example, the 2017 guidelines (Federal Government of Germany 2017), which is the most recent related document, introduces "interministerial" for national-level coordination whereas the multilateral dimension is captured under the heading "international partnerships". Last but not least, in the coalition agreement of the current 'grand coalition' government (Federal Government of Germany 2018: 20), the concept is summarised under "comprehensive and networked approach", which makes this phrase seem to be the term that all ministries and the ruling parties (CDU, CSU and SPD) have been able to agree upon.

This phenomenon of having too many cooks in the nomenclature kitchen, so to speak, hints at just how coherent (or incoherent) a coherence policy might get in Germany. The decentralised federal administration grants ministries a high degree of autonomy in terms of management, policymaking and implementation. In this system of diffuse leadership, even the Chancellery is only the *primus inter pares*. In other words, despite being the most important body for coordination, its steering powers are weak in terms of execution. However, whenever responsibilities for policies are shared and relate to cross-cutting issues, decision-making relies exclusively on cooperation and negotiation regarding which procedural rules of the federal government will apply. To make this process run more smoothly, there are two inter-departmental coordination mechanisms. The first mechanism is somewhat negative, as it enshrines what is commonly known as turf battling. In this case, policies are developed in one ministry, then successively checked and amended by other ministries, and then adopted (or not) in the federal cabinet. The second, which is more ambitious as well as used to a certain

extent in the realm of crisis and conflict management, is positive in that it involves jointly drafting policies in specially established inter-departmental formations.

Despite the lack of consistence terminology discussed above, it is nevertheless evident that all German federal ministries that have traditionally been involved with external affairs have embraced the coherence agenda and are actively participating in further developing the approach. Federal ministries dealing with justice, education, the environment, health, social and cultural issues, migration, economic matters, food, gender and trade policies are also included, as the related documents underline through many cross-sectoral references. In fact, all ministries have been invited to join the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention, which has been the central coordination structure of the networked approach since it was launched by the action plan of 2004 (Federal Government of Germany 2004).

The AA plays a prominent role in the triad of the traditional external actors. All crisis- and conflict-related issues as well as related cooperation with other ministries are centred in the AA. The Directorate-General for Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, created in March 2015 after a review of German foreign policy, is in charge of these tasks. This so-called Directorate-General S (D-G S) has 150 diplomats and a considerably increased annual budget of EUR 3 billion at its disposal (which also includes humanitarian aid). Unlike before, the AA now has an outright operative role within the new coherence policy framework in that it designs and implements its own projects. These projects focus on front-loaded stabilisation measures lasting a maximum of one year, which allows for an immediate and likewise more political reaction. The operational role now assumed by the AA serves two purposes at once: In addition to being able to take early action before a crisis manifests itself, it aims to prove to its international partners that Germany is meeting their demands to take on more responsibility. What's more, the AA has established the offices of special representative for crisis prevention and one for humanitarian aid within the D-G S to enhance the public visibility of its policies.

When it comes to international commitments and coordination with the EU, the picture is not quite so simple. For obvious reasons, the AA's European Directorate-General is in charge of overseeing and coordinating all EU-related policies. It has a special unit for foreign and security policy and crisis prevention (which, of course, raises the question of how this unit relates to the new D-G S unit for crisis prevention). Then there is the Political Directorate-General 2, whose EUCOR unit is tasked with coordinating CFSP and CSDP policies as well as interactions with three Brussels-based organisations: the European Union's Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations (RELEX), and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of the Council of the European Union. Contrary to what one would expect, responsibility for all matters related to the EU's integrated approach to external crises and conflict management is bundled in this political directorate-general rather than in the DG-S.

Among the AA's actors is the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF), which is the ministry's implementing organisation for recruiting, training, preparing, deploying and supporting civilian experts for peace operations, such as observing elections, mediation and democracy promotion. At present, the non-profit company has a pool of over 1,000 experts.

The civilian orientation of German crisis responses has long given the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) a key role in managing peacebuilding and human-security efforts. It has done so by taking a long-term, structural approach and by developing tailor-made budget lines and a sophisticated administrative structure, such as its own crisis early warning system. Since 1999, it has maintained its own pool of experts, the Civil Peace Service (ZFD). Together with the GIZ, Germany's society for international cooperation, it also commands a long-established technical implementing organisation, whose over 20,000 members are active in 120 countries worldwide. Without question, the BMZ has the greatest experience and resources available to design and implement projects aimed at combating poverty, building social and economic infrastructure, or promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the BMZ recently overhauled its structures and created a whole new directorate-general, called 'Marshall Plan with Africa: Displacement and Migration', in the belief that conflict prevention is best served by fighting the root causes of conflict and migration. This directorate-general also houses the division (223: Peace and Security, Disaster Risk Management) responsible for all aspects of networked security policy, which represents the BMZ on the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention (discussed above).

The primacy of the German approach's civilian orientation to crisis and conflict management has (as expected) had the opposite effect on the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), which has been rather sidelined. Nevertheless, its contributions to Germany's prevention approach have increased over the years in the area of security-sector reform (SSR) and post-conflict reconstruction, most recently with the just published strategy on these issues (Federal Government of Germany 2019b). In fact, owing to its roughly three decades of deployments on multilateral missions abroad, the BMVg is perhaps the ministry that requires the least convincing regarding the usefulness of a coherence approach. In terms of soldiers deployed and mission duration, the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan stand out. However, these were under the command of civilian organisations rather than the armed forces (the Bundeswehr).

The white papers of both 2006 (BMVg 2006) and 2016 (Federal Government of Germany 2016) place the Bundeswehr unconditionally within the larger context of an increasingly networked security architecture in which military instruments take a back seat to civilian ones. Of note is the fact that the 2016 white paper talks more about the need for civil-military coordination than does the 2017 development report (BMZ 2017). Furthermore, with the Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation of the Bundeswehr in Nienburg, Lower Saxony, the BMVg has created its own competence centre for civil-military cooperation in missions abroad. The centre supports a wide range of similar initiatives on both the multinational and civil society levels. An example of the former is its annual hosting of NATO's biggest CIMIC exercise ('Joint Cooperation'), and an example of the latter is the centre's recent engagement in the 'Common Effort Community' network.

In the course of implementing the networked approach, the BMVg has also changed its ministerial setup. In Political Department 1, which deals with security and defence policy as well as the management of all directorate-generals of the BMVg, a separate unit (Pol I 5) has been created for networking security measures and interacting with academia and civil society. In addition, two units have been set up in Political Department 2, which focuses on strategy development, operations and arms control. The Pol II 1 unit deals explicitly with the basics of

networked security policy and represents the BMVg in the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention. The second unit (Pol II 5) deals with the Enable and Enhance Initiative (discussed in greater detail below).

Let us now turn from horizontal interministerial cooperation to vertical coordination involving Germany's lower house of parliament (the Bundestag) and civil society. Germany's constitution gives the Bundestag a strong position in foreign and security policy. For example, without a mandate from the Bundestag, the Bundeswehr cannot take part in missions abroad. Politically, however, this position is rather weak, as the public and the media (the direction of causality can be debated) have tended to show little interest in foreign and security policy issues. Indeed, it must be stressed that political careers in Germany are made (and broken) in the realm of domestic politics. In any case, since 2010, parliamentary monitoring and control of Germany's coherence agenda has been exercised by the Subcommittee on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and Integrated Action. Perhaps due to its small size, the subcommittee seems to have developed a working relationship that transcends mere party allegiance. For example, in its hearings, it has presented a very united front to members of the executive branch and, in doing so, it has also indirectly contributed to fostering more interministerial coordination in preparation for such hearings.

Turning to civil society, for historical reasons, the peace movement has been particularly strong in Germany. Its political roots lie in the environmental Green Party and the far-left Left Party, but also in the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Strictly speaking, one should speak of distinct development and peace movements. However, since the objectives of both movements overlap for the most part in terms of advocating a purely values-based peace policy and rejecting force as an acceptable means in conflict transformation, one can speak of a single 'peace community' organised into two major platforms: the umbrella organisation of development and humanitarian aid NGOs in Germany (VENRO) and the German Platform for Peaceful Conflict Management. Furthermore, the churches play a particularly prominent role in the developmental organisations. Indeed, their influence on the framing of Germany's coherence approach has been – and will continue to be – both far-reaching and profound, and the 'rebranding' of the German approach from 'networked security' to a more neutral and peace-friendly 'networked approach' can primarily be attributed to their lobbying. In addition, there are a number of think tanks with close ties to the 'peace community'. Their research likewise focuses on the peaceful resolution of conflicts and arms control. What's more, there is not a (visible) 'strategic community', such as the one used to characterise Anglo-Saxon discourses on peace and security.

4 | How does your country operationalise a WGA?

As already mentioned, the autonomy that the German constitution confers on the federal ministries unquestionably has an impact on how they work together. Rather than replacing established practices, the networked approach as well as the new structures and procedures that it has created merely complement them. Indeed, they are intended to intensify the exchange of information and to facilitate collaboration and coordination. However, they do not create joint offices, joint training or new joint decision-making procedures that would influence established ministerial prerogatives. This is explicitly highlighted in the introduction of the Operations Manual (Federal Government of Germany 2019d), where we read that the agreed-

upon practises and procedures do not invalidate either the departmental principle (Ressortprinzip) or the long-established guidelines under which the BMZ (BMZ 2008) operates in development cooperation. In particular, it says (Federal Government of Germany 2019d: 4): “The principle of ministries, as enshrined in the Basic Law, remains intact. In other words, each federal minister self-sufficiently directs and is accountable for his or her own area of operations.” Thus, the greater part of Germany’s crisis- and conflict-management policies will continue to be formulated and implemented outside the newly created structures. This concerns day-to-day work as well as dealing with the issue at the highest political level.

The institutional building block of Germany’s coherence approach is the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention (Ressortkreis), which was formed in 2004 and is open to all ministries. Also under the new guidelines, this steering group continues to be the working body at the ministerial level of heads of units for information exchange and coordination on all relevant crisis-prevention and conflict-management issues. However, the steering group does not have any operational powers, as the relevant ministries retain their authority to decide on and support the development of respective crisis-prevention capacities within the framework of their respective jurisdictions. Thus, day-to-day business is carried out not within the steering group, but rather by units in the ministries responsible for individual crisis countries or regions, which are usually chaired by the responsible country department or the regional representative of the AA. In addition, the body forms the interface to the roughly 20-person Advisory Board for Civilian Crisis Prevention, which is composed of representatives drawn from civil society, academia and the business community.

In 2012, with the adoption of the first-ever interministerial guidelines ‘for a coherent policy of the Federal Government towards fragile states’ (AA, BMVg and BMZ 2012), special task forces were set up among the AA, the BMVg and the BMZ. Meetings of these task forces are convened and chaired by the responsible regional commissioner/ envoy of the AA rather than by the recently established D-G S. This is done in coordination with counterparts from the BMVg, the BMZ or other relevant ministries in individual cases. The task forces perform context analyses and coordinate policies for Iraq/Syria/Anti-IS, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, the Sahel and the Lake Chad region while remaining in close contact with the diplomatic missions on the ground. For Afghanistan and Pakistan, such interministerial working groups already existed beforehand. Rather than having set meeting dates, they convene when doing so is deemed appropriate.

A new body, introduced with the 2017 guidelines (Federal Government of Germany 2017), were the interministerial working groups tasked with developing joint strategies for promoting the rule of law, supporting security-sector reform and dealing with the past/reconciliation. Their respective strategy reports were published in autumn 2019 (Federal Government of Germany 2019a-c). One of the results of this strategy-development process is that the three previous sectoral strategy working groups are to be merged into a cross-strategy working group, which is to begin its work in the course of 2019. It is not yet known whether further interministerial strategy groups are planned to deal with other relevant topics in the field of crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding.

According to the Operations Manual (Federal Government of Germany 2019d: 6), early warning and crisis detection shall be taken care of in a newly established special interministerial ‘Horizon Scanning’ working group that shall be able to draw on all analytical

capacities, including those of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Likewise, in the future, departmental analyses are to be regularly shared with other departments and, where this exchange does not lead to a sufficiently shared evaluation of the situation, joint analyses are to be commissioned.

In addition to the above-mentioned formations and on the next-higher ministerial level, the guidelines (Federal Government of Germany 2017) establish the 'Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace' interministerial coordinating group, which is composed of the heads of the relevant directorate-generals in the various ministries and is tasked with dealing with the results and recommendations of the Horizon Scanning working group as well as with other outstanding issues that the Interministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention or the task forces and strategy groups could not reach agreement on. The body meets on a quarterly basis as well as when required. In this case, the chair rotates between the Federal Chancellery, the BMVg, the BMZ and the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Home Affairs (BMI).

Outside the framework defined by the guidelines, at the highest level of interministerial coordination, the state secretaries and the head of the Federal Chancellery's Directorate-General 2 (Foreign, Security and Development Policy) meet in various formats to deal with crisis-management issues. One of these formats is the so-called weekly security policy *jour fixe*, which brings together representatives of the Chancellery with the state secretaries of the AA, the BMI and the BMVg. Another such *jour fixe* deals with foreign and development policy issues and brings together representatives of the Chancellery, the AA, the BMVg and the BMZ. Additional formats include the Round Table of State Secretaries on Afghanistan and Mali (with representatives from the Chancellery, the Federal Ministry of Finance, the BMI, the AA, the BMVg, the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, the BMZ and the Foreign Intelligence Service) and the Interministerial Steering Group on Africa at the level of state secretaries and heads of the directorate-generals.

Above all stands the federal cabinet, which has overall responsibility for overseeing coherence policies. The cabinet's Federal Security Council (Bundessicherheitsrat) coordinates the government's security and defence policies and is responsible for approving arms exports. Although its meetings are secret, all publicly visible indications are that the council's efforts are predominantly geared towards arms-export controls rather than coordinating German foreign and security policy. A separate cabinet formation, such as the one recently established for climate protection, does not yet exist for the area of crisis and conflict management.

Furthermore, as explicitly highlighted in the guidelines (Federal Government of Germany 2017) and the sectoral strategy reports (Federal Government of Germany 2019a-c), there are the diplomatic missions abroad, which reportedly play an important role in assessing situations as well as in planning and implementing measures. German embassies have long been staffed with personnel from other ministries. What's more, as the conception of security becomes broader and more cross-cutting, the number of such staff members is growing and the ministries are increasing their involvement in the activities listed above.

Turning now to the issue of culture and training, one can say that the experience which government staff have gained while on assignments abroad has undoubtedly boosted their eagerness and ability to cooperate at home. The exchange of civil servants between ministries also contributes to the latter, as was called for in the 2006 white paper (BMVg 2006) and again

underlined in the Operations Manual (Federal Government of Germany 2019d). However, to date, the number of liaison officers exchanged between ministries each year has remained in the single digits.

In the field of training and deploying civilian, police and military personnel, no uniform training schedule or interministerial facilities exist. However, the respective academies of the AA and BMVg appear to have included the networked approach in their curricula, and their future role is highlighted in the Operations Manual as well as by the three sectoral strategy reports (Federal Government of Germany 2019a-d), which echo the need to establish good practices and promote interministerial learning by including the topics of SSR, rule of law and transitional justice in ministry-specific and interministerial training measures. In addition, the AA has added mediation courses to its attaché training, which are provided by the Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF).

Regarding advanced training, the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS), in particular, offers courses designed to meet these requirements. However, these courses are not compulsory. Together with the BMZ, the BMVg and the BMI, the AA organises an annual seminar for junior staff entitled 'Joint Action in Fragile Contexts'. Training in the field of civil-military cooperation and mission preparation is especially provided by BMVg institutions, such as the aforementioned Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation of the Bundeswehr in Nienburg and the German Armed Forces United Nations Training Centre in Hammelburg, Bavaria, where a two-week course on post-crisis preparation was held for the first time in 2019.

In terms of procedures and budgets, the 2012 interministerial guidelines on fragile states (AA, BMVg and BMZ 2012) set out the first rules of procedure applying to the working level. As a follow-up, the 2017 guidelines (Federal Government of Germany 2017) obliged the government to issue an interministerial practical guide, which was published in autumn 2019 as the Operational Manual (Federal Government of Germany 2019d). The latter stipulates that better coordination is mainly to be achieved in the areas of early warning, policy planning and steering, and monitoring and evaluation. What's more, the procedure for developing future strategies (e.g. via scenario workshops and retreats) was also further elaborated, and decision criteria for dealing with other potential crisis countries and regions were adopted. Nevertheless, all the many procedural improvements for interministerial cooperation set forth in the Operations Manual – whether concerning analysis and needs assessment, joint strategy development, planning, exchange with partner institutions and international organisations, mutual information-sharing and participation in departmental planning, financial contributions to international funds and facilities, or cooperation in government negotiations and international conferences – are still dependent on the discretion and (voluntary) willingness of the respective ministries.

Although under discussion for quite some time and repeatedly demanded by the parliamentary Subcommittee on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and Integrated Action, the Operations Manual did not introduce a common or pooled budget for crisis and conflict management. The only exception relates to the Enhance and Enable Initiative, whose measures are almost exclusively dedicated to SSR as well as jointly financed and administered by the AA and the BMVg on the basis of a framework agreement concluded in 2015 (BMVg and AA 2019). Nevertheless, the pressure to better harmonise instruments and to pool funding is growing. For example, the first-ever spending review of the Federal Ministry of Finance

conducted on the policy area 'Humanitarian aid and transitional aid including the interfaces crisis prevention, crisis response, stabilisation and development cooperation' (BMF 2018) has revealed the many duplications and overlaps between measures implemented by the AA and the BMZ. This inefficient use of budget funds prompted these two ministries to develop a concept for joint analysis and coordinated planning. Whether additional spending reviews will lead to better coordination in other fields is anybody's guess. For now, however, the Operations Manual (Federal Government of Germany 2019d) at least suggests a systematic recording of measures in countries in which several ministries are active. Such a database already exists for Afghanistan. In addition, in accordance with Chapter 5.1 of the Federal Government's Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries (GGO) (BMI 2011), it is now envisaged that, in the case of payments to international organisations, the ministry responsible for the organisation in question will involve the other contributing ministries in the preliminary stages.

Furthermore, when it comes to implementation reports and scrutiny, the guidelines (Federal Government of Germany 2017) have established a review process that could serve as a lessons learned process and help to improve policy coherence. This offers parliament and civil society a chance to measure the government by its words and deeds. The parliamentary Subcommittee on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and Integrated Action has already stated that it sees monitoring the implementation of the Operations Manual as one of its primary tasks in the current legislative term. The first implementation report is expected in 2021, and a fundamental overhaul is due four years later. Regarding parliamentary scrutiny, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) launched a governmental inquiry in February 2019 titled 'Strengthening networked action in foreign, security and development' (Deutscher Bundestag 2019). With over 160 questions, the inquiry will force Germany's government to take a position on its performance regarding the entire networked approach. The government's response is expected in late autumn 2019.

5 | Conclusions

For all those who envision tight leadership and clear decision-making structures as key factors behind successful political coherence, the conditions prevailing in Germany must seem like a nightmare. For one thing, there are multiple players and the chancellor, despite being the *primus inter pares*, must convince rather than command his or her team. On top of that, political processes are protracted, are based on consensus, and end in compromises that often (though not always) do less to achieve the stated goals than to satisfy party and power preferences or even personal vanities.

In the absence of an outright national foreign and security strategy that would establish a fundamental and goal-oriented framework for action, Germany's networked approach still seems to be more about establishing 'an equal footing' or 'a level playing field' among relevant ministries. A case in point is the fact that there are three key documents in the field of crisis and conflict management in external affairs, each of which seems to highlight the specific responsibilities and ambitions of one of the three key players: the foreign (AA), defence (BMVg) or economic cooperation and development (BMZ) ministries.

During the drafting phase of the guidelines on preventing crises, revolving conflicts and building peace (Federal Government of Germany 2017), it became apparent just how much the three leading ministries were still demarcating and asserting their competences and decision-making sovereignty in relation to each other while struggling for recognition and leadership in the process. The BMZ, in particular, but also the BMVg contested the AA's tight grip on coordination among the three bodies. Indeed, both the BMZ and the BMVg saw their contribution to international crisis management as being just as relevant as that of the AA given that the BMZ was implementing the majority of projects on the ground and the BMVg was guaranteeing a secure environment for such efforts. Even the title of the guidelines was long contested. In fact, to ultimately break the logjam, it was made longer so that every ministry could find itself represented, and the word "civil" was deleted so as not to implicitly indicate the absence of the military arm. After all, seeing that the term 'networked security' had already been dropped in favour of the more civilian-sounding 'networked approach', inserting 'civil' would have constituted the second affront to the BMVg.

Despite the ever-growing consensus in Germany that a well-functioning networked approach to crisis and conflict is required, it has yet to be seen to what degree the interministerial coordination bodies – whether reinforced or newly established by the 2017 guidelines – will ultimately succeed in meeting their goals. However, doubts about this success are raised by the fact that the actual day-to-day operational work related to managing external crises and conflicts is primarily carried out outside the newly established framework. Furthermore, the guidelines cannot obscure the fact that their focus is predominately on the civilian side of crisis and conflict management and does not cover the entire conflict cycle. This is in line with Germany's previous involvements in EU-, UN- and NATO-led missions. With the exceptions of the Kosovo and Afghanistan missions, Germany's contributions have predominantly been humanitarian or limited to advisory or support roles, such as monitoring, transport, training or surveillance via air or ship. In all these cases, fewer than 100 civil or military staff were seconded.

These days, however, Germany's engagement is particularly focused on supporting reforms in the military- and civil-security sectors, as is shown by the support it is providing to the ongoing EUTM missions in Mali and Somalia and to the EUAM Ukraine. It can be assumed that Germany will maintain this level of commitment, particularly in the Sahel region, and is prepared to be similarly engaged in the Middle East, as well, should the course be set for ending the wars in Syria or Yemen. What would come as a real surprise (and would constitute a genuine paradigm shift) is if Germany were to take on the risks associated with leadership within the EU, NATO or the UN as well as to engage in peace-enforcing missions. As long as this is not the case, it must be said that Germany is failing to live up to the ambitions it set forth in the 2006 and 2016 white papers on security policy as well as underlined in many official speeches. Instead, the non-holistic nature of its approach shows once again how much the Nazi past still affects today's policymaking. Indeed, despite all the new rhetoric to the contrary, Germany has so far failed to answer the question – and back it up with deeds – of what it means to assume more responsibility in an increasingly crisis-ridden world. Accordingly, the frustration among its partners – not only in the EU and NATO, but also in the UN – is unlikely to vanish anytime soon.

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